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I. INTRODUCTION
More than a decade has passed since William H. Rehnquist be-
came an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court.
The Court's most conservative member, with a propensity toward
dissenting alone, Rehnquist has often been perceived by Supreme
Court observers as somewhat isolated-a Justice whose views are
not likely to be accepted by a majority of the Court.' Belying such
an image, however, is the fact that Rehnquist has written the opin-
ion in many important cases, that he and Chief Justice Burger
often vote together, and that when he and the Chief Justice are in
* Ph.D, Political Science, University of California, Santa Barbara; Assistant
Professor, Political Science, University of Tulsa.
1. Rydell, Mr. Justice Rehnquist and Judicial Self-Restraint, 26 HASTINGS L.J.
875, 876 (1975).
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the majority, the Chief Justice is quite likely to assign the opinion
to Rehnquist. Moreover, with five Justices over the age of seventy
currently serving on the Court, it is likely that there will be one or
more new Supreme Court Justices within the next few years who
will share Rehnquist's ideological persuasion. Indeed, it is possi-
ble that Rehnquist may emerge in the near future as the leader of
a dominant conservative bloc of the Supreme Court.
The purpose of this article is twofold: first, it seeks to clarify
Rehnquist's judicial philosophy by analyzing his equal protection
opinions, and second, it attempts to determine whether his influ-
ence among the other members of the Court is expanding. Justice
Rehnquist has offered explanations of his judicial philosophy in
public addresses as well as in his judicial opinions. The article en-
titled, The Notion of a Living Constitution2 (hereinafter referred to
as The Living Constitution), is Rehnquist's most explicit state-
ment of a judicial philosophy based on a belief in the democratic
nature of the United States' Constitution. In Rehnquist's view, the
Constitution gives the popularly elected branches of government,
not the judiciary, the responsibility of balancing rights and inter-
ests, and of determining the goals of the political system. Such a
perception of the American constitutional system provides the the-
oretical basis for Rehnquist's approach to constitutional
interpretation.
This article compares the views expressed in Rehnquist's arti-
cle, The Living Constitution, with Rehnquist's equal protection
opinions in order to demonstrate that Rehnquist has a coherent
judicial philosophy that is reflected in his judicial opinions. In or-
der to test the hypothesis that Rehnquist's influence among the
other justices is increasing, this article analyzes the Supreme
Court's voting in the equal protection cases in which Rehnquist
has participated. Also, an analysis of Rehnquist's judicial philoso-
phy requires that a brief overview of the Supreme Court's equal
protection jurisprudence be given.
3
2. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L REV. 693 (1976).
3. Section II of this article provides a brief overview of the Supreme Court's
equal protection jurisprudence as a background for Rehnquist's approach to
equal protection. For extensive analyses of the equal protection doctrine, see
A. BONNICKSEN, CIVIL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES: PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION
ch. 5 (1982); Barret, Judicial Supervision of Legislative Clasifications-A
More Modest Rule for Equal Protection?, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 89; Gunther, The
Supreme Court 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a New Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1
(1972); Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal Protec-
tion Guarantee-Prohibited, Neutral and Permissive Classifications, 62 GEo.
L.J. 1071 (1974); Perry, Modern Equal Protection A Conceptualization and
Appraisal, 1979 CoLmU. L. REV. 1023; Equal Protection and the Burger Court,
2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 645 (1975).
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II. MODERN EQUAL PROTECTION DOCTRINE
The United States Supreme Court's use of the due process
clause during the early years of the twentieth century (to scruti-
nize and often to invalidate federal and state laws regulating the
economy) provided the foundation for the later emergence of the
equal protection clause as an important tool of judicial interven-
tion. Chief Justice Stone's well-known "fourth footnote" in United
States v. Carolene Products Co. ,4 signaled the Court's withdrawal
from an intensive review of economic regulations and its move-
ment toward the more lenient standard of "rational review."
Stone's footnote also suggested an increased scrutiny of legislation
infringing on the rights specifically protected by the Constitution,
as well as the rights of "discrete and insular minorities."5 There-
fore, Stone's footnote in Carolene Products provided the basis for
the development of the Court's double standard: deference to leg-
islative decisions in the economic realm but activism in the area of
personal rights. When Justice Douglas used the equal protection
clause in Skinner v. Oklahoma6 to invalidate a state law that pro-
vided for compulsory sterilization after multiple convictions for
certain types of felonies, he emphasized that such legislation inter-
fered with the fundamental liberties of marriage and procreation.
In Korematsu v. United States,7 Justice Black made explicit the
notion that race is a suspect classification and, therefore, requires
the most stringent standard of review. 8
Justice Stone's footnote in Carolene Products, Douglas's em-
4. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
5. The fourth footnote of Carolene Products reads:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a
specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten
amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be em-
braced within the Fourteenth.
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which re-
stricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to
bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to
more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the
Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation.
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into
the review of statutes directed at particular religious, or national, or
racial minorities: whether prejudice against discrete and insular mi-
norities maybe a special condition, which tends, seriously, to curtail
the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon
to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry.
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (citations omitted).
6. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
7. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
8. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1879) (suggesting for the
first time that race may be a suspect classification).
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phasis on fundamental rights in Skinner, and Black's reiteration,
in Korematsu, that race is a suspect classification, provided the
framework for what was to become the Warren Court's two-tier ap-
proach to equal protection: the traditional "rational basis" test,
which required only that a classification be rationally related to
achieving a legitimate end when economic regulations were chal-
lenged; and the "strict scrutiny" test, which required that a classifi-
cation be the only means of achieving a compelling state interest
when the challenged legislation involved racial classifications or
fundamental rights.
Chief Justice Earl Warren, in describing the traditional ration-
ality standard in McGowen v. Maryland,9 stated:
The Fourteenth Amendment permits the States a wide scope for discre-
tion in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens differently than
others. The Constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification
rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objec-
tive. State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitu-
tional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some
inequality.1 0
The fact that the rational basis test has resulted in the invalidation
of only one classification since the 1930's,n reveals the deferential,
inconsequential nature of the requirement of "rationality." In con-
trast, the strict scrutiny test has been characterized as "strict in
theory, fatal in fact."'12 As Chief Justice Warren stated in Loving v.
Virginia,13 "if [racial classifications] are ever to be upheld, they
must be shown to be necessary to the accomplishment of some
permissible state objective, independent of the racial discrimina-
tion which it was the object of the Fourteenth Amendment to elim-
inate."14 In short, with the two-tier approach, the Court's choice of
the tier virtually predetermines the result.
Race was clearly one suspect classification that demanded
strict scrutiny; but the Warren Court suggested that there might
be additional suspect classifications-illegitimacy and wealth, for
example.'5 The Court has also used the strict scrutiny test to in-
9. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
10. Id. at 425-26.
11. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), overruled, City of New Orleans v. Dukes,
427 U.S. 297 (1976).
12. G. GuNTHER, CONsTrrU'oNAL LAw: CASES AND MATEPRALs 611 (10th ed. 1980).
13. 388 U.S. 1 (1976).
14. Id. at 11.
15. In Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968), and Glona v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins.
Co., 391 J.S. 73 (1968), the Court invalidated state laws that distinguished
between legitimate and illegitimate children for the purpose of recovering
death benefits. Although the Court in Levy expressly used the rational basis
test, Justice Douglas suggested that illegitimacy might be considered suspect
when he stated: "We start from the premise that illegitimate children are not
'nonpersons.' They are humans, live, and have their being. They are clearly
1984]
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validate legislative classifications which infringe fundamental in-
terests. Such interests include: interstate travel,16 voting,'7
criminal appeals,18 and marriage.19 In addition, the Warren Court
issued tantalizing statements during the 1960's implying that there
might be additional fundamental interests, such as welfare bene-
fits, housing, and education, yet to be found within the text of the
Constitution.20
Although the Burger Court has not rejected the fundamental
interests concept established by the Warren Court, it has refused
to extend this strand of equal protection beyond those fundamen-
tal interests established during the 1960's.21 In particular, the
Court has refused to extend the suspect label to classifications
based on illegitimacy and sex. The Burger Court has, however, ad-
ded a third standard of review to the Warren Court's two-tier ap-
proach: an intermediate standard that falls between the maximum
scrutiny standard, which is demanded when racial classifications
are challenged, and the minimum scrutiny standard, which is re-
quired when economic regulations are involved. The Burger court
has used this intermediate standard to invalidate legislative classi-
fications based on illegitimacy and sex without actually declaring
those categories to be suspect. In doing so, the Court has held that
classifications based on illegitimacy and sex must be substantially
related to an important governmental interest.22 This intermediate
'persons' within the meaning of The Equal Protection Clause... ." Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70 (1968). Regarding wealth as a suspect classification,
Justice Douglas stated: "Lines drawn on the basis of wealth or property, like
those of race, are traditionally disfavored." Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elec-
tions, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) (citations omitted).
16. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
17. See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
18. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956).
19. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
20. Much of the speculation about the possible expansion of fundamental inter-
ests arose over dicta contained in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 619 (1969).
Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Shapiro interpreted the facts of the
case as involving a denial of "welfare aid upon which may depend the ability
of the families to obtain their very means to subsist-food, shelter, and other
necessities of life." Id. at 627. Justice Harlan's dissent criticized Brennan's
"cryptic suggestion, . . . that the 'compelling interest' test is applicable
merely because the result of the classification may be to deny the appellees
'food, shelter, and other necessities of life'. . . ." Id. at 661.
21. In San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), Justice
Powell stated that wealth was not a suspect classification and education was
not a fundamental interest.
22. For example, in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), Justice Brennan stated
that "[t] o withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that
classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and
[Vol. 63:288
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standard has not been accepted by all members of the Court; in-
deed, in those cases where the standard has been applied, the re-
sults have not been predictable. However, the intermediate
standard has been regarded as one of the important innovations of
the Burger Court, providing a realistic, flexible method of judging
classifications based on legitimacy and sex.23 Rehnquist, however,
has remained adamantly opposed to the three-tier approach, pre-
ferring instead to adhere to his own version of the traditional two-
tier analysis, i.e., that minimum scrutiny should be applied to all
classifications except those based on race, and that the Court
should carefully avoid the use of the maximum scrutiny test, even
where racial classifications are involved. The basis for Rehnquist's
opposition to the intermediate standard, as well as the basis for
Rehnquist's judicial philosophy, has been articulated in his article,
The Living Constitution.2 4
I1. THE LIVING CONSTITUTION
In The Living Constitution, Rehnquist quotes Abraham Lin-
coln's first inaugural address to capture the essence of his judicial
philosophy:
[T~he candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the government,
upon vital questions, affecting the whole people, is to be irrevocably fixed
by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are made, in ordinary
litigation between parties in personal actions, the people will have ceased
to be their own rulers, having, to that extent, practically resigned their
government, into the hands of that extent tribunal.25
Rehnquist develops this theme throughout his article, presenting a
view of the Constitution that is consistent with Lincoln's indict-
ment of what Lincoln believed to be judicial usurpation of the
democratic process.
Three closely related, and perhaps overlapping, premises can
be identified in Rehnquist's professed judicial philosophy. The
first premise is that the American political system, as envisioned
by the framers of the Constitution and established by the Consti-
tution, is a democracy. Second, in a democratic system, laws must
be made according to the established process rather than imposed
must be substantially related to [the] achievement of those objectives." Id.
at 197.
23. Justice Marshall's "sliding scale" approach, which was first articulated in
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1970), and elaborated in his dissent in San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), reveals the inade-
quacies of the two-tier approach. Marshall refers to the Court's equal protec-
tion analysis as a spectrum of standards.
24. Rehnquist, supra note 2.
25. Id. at 702 (quoting THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAm LINcoLN 268 (R. Bas-
ler ed. 1953)).
1984]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
from outside the political arena. The third premise is that the only
"democratic" method of interpreting the Constitution is to ex-
amine the words of the document and to interpret those words in
conformity with the original intention of the framers of the Consti-
tution. Taken together, these three premises prescribe a very lim-
ited judicial role in interpreting the Constitution. In fact, judicial
review comes to be viewed as counter-majoritarian and ultimately
as an undesirable obstacle to the democratic process.
Rehnquist views the Constitution as a democratic document, a
document which represents the original will of the people as de-
scribed by Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison.26
But, while Marshall applied the notion of the Constitution as re-
flecting the original will of the people to defend judicial review (ar-
guing that the judiciary was responsible for interpreting and giving
meaning to the Constitution), Rehnquist uses this notion to limit
and ultimately to condemn judicial intervention in the acts of other
branches of government. Marshall, writing in 1803, was close
enough in time to the ratification of the Constitution to argue con-
vincingly that the Constitution was genuinely a fundamental char-
ter that had emanated from the people.2 Today, Rehnquist argues
that judges are no longer guardians of the Constitution; instead,
they constitute "a small group of fortunately situated people with a
roving commission to second-guess Congress, state legislatures,
and state and federal administrative officers, concerning what is
best for the country."2s The judiciary has become the destroyer of
democracy rather than its protector.
In Rehnquist's view, it is not the proper function- of the judici-
ary to keep the political system in tune with the times; the Consti-
tution gave this responsibility to the popularly elected branches of
government. Moreover, while the limits placed on state and fed-
eral governments were designed to ensure that the government
would not transgress the rights established in the Constitution,
these limits should be viewed as procedural constraints rather
than substantive directives. Although the Constitution provided
for the separation of powers, it did not obligate the government to
solve substantive problems--Congress, the Presidency, state legis-
latures and governors have the authority to choose not to take ac-
tion to resolve problems. In Rehnquist's view, the judiciary's role
becomes one of simply ensuring that the other branches of govern-
ment do not go beyond the explicit limits of the authority vested in
them by the Constitution, not one of judging the substance of their
policies.
26. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
27. Rehnquist, supra note 2, at 697.
28. Id. at 698.
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The second premise of Rehnquist's argument in The Living
Constitution has been characterized as a relativistic theory of con-
stitutional interpretation.29 Essentially, Rehnquist argues that no
value can be demonstrated to be intrinsically superior to any
other. A particular value is authoritative only when it is favored by
a majority of the Court. Rehnquist states: "The laws that emerge
after a typical political struggle in which various individual judg-
ments are debated likewise take on a form of moral goodness be-
cause they have been enacted into positive law."30 Although the
people may have strong, deeply felt values, those values remain
merely personal until they become law, either by legislation or by
Constitutional amendment. The minority has no authority to im-
pose its value judgments on the country, even if the minority hap-
pens to be the Supreme Court. This element of Rehnquist's
judicial philosophy constitutes a moral relativism that ultimately
rests on majority rule to define society's values. As its necessary
corollary, this theory removes from the judiciary the responsibility
of keeping popular opinion in check. It does not consider the pos-
sibility that the majority may be wrong rather, it denies the notion
of the existence of natural law or rights. In essence, Rehnquist's
relativism would lead to the rejection of the Supreme Court's role
as the guardian of individual rights against an unjust or errant
majority.
Finally, Rehnquist's approach to constitutional interpretation
has also been aptly characterized as immanent positivistism. 3 1 His
method of interpreting the Constitution is to rely on the words and
clauses of the document itself, confining their meaning to the
words of that text. Where the words do not suffice, he searches for
the intent of the framers of the Constitution. As Walter Murphy
has articulated, there are numerous problems with such an ap-
proach.3 2 For example, it is questionable whether the true intent
of the framers can ever be adequately discerned. However, such
problems have not seemed to have deterred Rehnquist's emphasis
on the American political system as a democracy, or on moral rela-
tivism and immanent positivism as an approach to interpreting the
Constitution. Together, these theories add up to a philosophy of
judicial restraint or, possibly, of wholesale judicial abdication of
the Court's review power to the popularly elected branches of
government.
29. Justice, A Relativistic Constitution, 52 U. CoLO. I- REv. 19 (1980).
30. Rehnquist, supra note 2, at 704.
31. Harris, Bonding Word and Polity: The Logic of American Constitutionalism,
76 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 34 (1982).
32. See, e.g., Murphy, An Ordering of Constitutional Values, 53 S. CA L REV. 703
(1980); Murphy, Book Review, Constitutional Interpretation: The Art of the
Historian, Magician, or Statesman?, 87 YALE, LJ. 1752 (1978).
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IV. REHNQUIST'S RATIONALITY REQUIREMENT: "FACILE
ABSTRACTIONS... TO JUSTIFY A RESULT"
Justice Rehnquist has described the Supreme Court's deci-
sions, with the exception of those involving classifications based
on race, as "an endless tinkering with legislative judgments, a se-
ries of conclusions unsupported by any central guiding princi-
ples." 33 His scrupulously crafted dissents have proliferated in
response to the majority's propensity toward invalidating legisla-
tive classifications based on sex, illegitimacy, or alienage. The
Court's position with regard to each of these classifications will
now be reviewed in greater detail.
A. Sex Classifications
The Supreme Court has determined that classifications based
on sex "must serve important governmental objectives and must
be substantially related to achievement of those objectives." 34
Furthermore, the governmental objectives of administrative ease
and convenience are not themselves sufficient to sustain classifica-
tions which are based on archaic and overbroad generalizations
and "gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes." 35 In fact,
the Supreme Court has stated that under this standard, the state
must show that a gender-neutral statute would be a less effective
means of achieving the stated objective.36
During Rehnquist's tenure, the Court has invalidated sex clas-
sifications in nine out of the seventeen cases to reach the Court.3 7
The list of sex-based laws which the Court has invalidated in-
cludes: an Oklahoma law which set the age for purchase of 3.2
beer at eighteen for females and twenty-one for males;38 a provi-
sion of the social security laws which allowed a widower to receive
survivors' benefits only if he was receiving one-half of his support
from his wife;3 9 an Alabama statute which required husbands, but
not wives, to pay alimony;40 a New York law that permitted an un-
wed mother, but not an unwed father, to block the adoption of a
33. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777 (1977).
34. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1977).
35. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1973).
36. Wengler v. Druggist Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980).
37. Sex classifications were invalidated in the following cases: Kirchberg v.
Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981); Wengeler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142
(1980); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268
(1979); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1977); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420
U.S. 636 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
38. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
39. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
40. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
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child by withholding consent;4 1 and a provision of the Missouri
workmen's compensation laws that denied a widower benefits
from his wife's work-related death unless he proved dependence
on her earnings, but granted a widow such benefits regardless of
any dependence.4 2
Rehnquist has disagreed with the majority in seven of the nine
cases in which the Court invalidated classifications based on sex.43
His objections to the majority's decisions emanate from his theory
of constitutional interpretation. Rehnquist argued in The Living
Constitution44 that the proper method of constitutional interpreta-
tion is to first look at the language of the document and then to the
original intent of the framers. According to Rehnquist, the original
legislative intent of the fourteenth amendment was to prohibit the
states from treating blacks differently than whites. He argues that
it is inappropriate for the Court to extend strict scrutiny of legisla-
tive classifications beyond the arena of racial discrimination.
Therefore, while Rehnquist admits that racial classifications are
presumptively invalid, he holds that, as to all other classifications,
the principle of equal protection simply requires "that persons
similarly situated should be treated similarly."45
Rehnquist also rejects the Court's intermediate standard of re-
view as being too subjective. How is the Court to know what objec-
tives are important, or whether a law is substantially related to the
achievement of such an objective? Rehnquist argues that these
phrases are so "diaphanous and elastic as to invite subjective judi-
cial preferences or prejudices relating to particular types of legisla-
41. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
42. Wengler v. Druggist Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980).
43. Rehnquist agreed with the majority in two cases. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,
420 U.S. 636 (1975), was a unanimous decision in which the Court invalidated
a provision of the Social Security Act that allowed a widower to receive survi-
vor's benefits only if he could show that he had been receiving one-half of his
support from his wife. Rehnquist wrote a concurring opinion in which he ar-
gued that there was no rational basis for distinguishing between mothers and
fathers when the interest of the child in receiving the full time attention of
the remaining parent was at stake.
In Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981), the Court unanimously inval-
idated a Louisiana statute that gave a husband, as "head and master" of prop-
erty jointly owned with his wife, the right to dispose of jointly held property
without the wife's consent. Rehnquist joined Stewart's concurring opinion
which emphasized that the decision did not apply to transactions executed
before the lower court decision.
44. See supra note 2.
45. The "similarly situated" language comes from F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Vir-
ginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920): "[T]he classification must be reasonable, not arbi-
trary and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons simi-
larly circumstanced shall be treated alike." Id. at 415.
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tion, masquerading as judgments whether such legislation is
directed at 'important' objectives, or whether the relationship to
those objectives is 'substantial' enough."4 6 Questions concerning
governmental objectives are appropriately left to elected officials;
judges are simply not equipped with the data or the expertise to
handle them. Since sex classifications do not warrant strict scru-
tiny and the intermediate standard of review is too subjective, the
only standard which can be applied to test sex-based classifica-
tions under the Rehnquist approach is the rational basis test. He
has argued that challenged sex classifications do not necessarily
fail this minimum requirement.47 Using language from opinions in
which the Court has upheld economic regulations against equal
protection challenges,46 Rehnquist pays maximum deference to
legislative decisions. If Rehnquist can discover any conceivable
relationship, no matter how tenuous, between a classification and
its stated purpose, he will vote to uphold the law. Thus, Rehn-
quist's standard of review clearly presupposes the result; it is an
approach that renders the equal protection clause inconsequential
when applied to sex-based classifications.
In gender-based classification cases, Rehnquist has added a cu-
rious line of reasoning to his objections to the use of the intermedi-
ate standard of review. He has argued that even if the Court were
to use heightened scrutiny when women are discriminated against,
men should not be able to challenge legislation that disadvantages
them. 49 This is because our American society has no tradition of
discrimination against males, implying that women need special
protection because of past discriminatory practices. However,
Rehnquist would be quick to add that, while women may need spe-
cial protection, such protection is not to be found in the equal pro-
tection clause.
When a majority of the Court has invalidated sex classifica-
tions, Rehnquist has contended, in dissent, that under the proper
standard of review the challenged legislation would easily stand.
Although the Court has generally remained unreceptive to Rehn-
quist's argument, it has, on two occasions, used the rational basis
test to invalidate legislative classifications based on sex.50 One
46. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 221 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
47. See, e.g., Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARv. L.
REv. 293 (1976). Shapiro argued that Rehnquist's rational basis test requires
only that a challenged classification not be entirely counterproductive with
respect to the purposes of the legislation in which it is contained.
48. For example, Rehnquist often quotes from McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420 (1961), and F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920).
49. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 218-221 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
50. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453
U.s. 57 (1981).
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such case involved a California statutory rape law which made
men criminally liable for engaging in sexual intercourse with fe-
males under the age of eighteen. The California Supreme Court
subjected the law to strict scrutiny and found the classification to
be justified by the compelling state interest of preventing teenage
pregnancies. When the United States Supreme Court decided the
case, Rehnquist, speaking for four justices, used the rational basis
test to uphold the law. In doing so, he made only a slight conces-
sion to the Court's customary use of the intermediate standard of
review for sex classifications: "[T] he traditional minimum ration-
ality test takes on a somewhat 'sharper focus' when gender-based
classifications are challenged."5 ' The purpose of the law, he found,
was to discourage illicit sexual intercourse with minor females.
There may have been a variety of reasons for the state to seek such
a purpose, e.g., concern about teenage pregnancies, protecting
young females from physical injury, and promoting various reli-
gious and moral attitudes towards pre-marital sex. The state has a
strong interest in such a purpose because illegitimate pregnancies
often result in abortions and additions to the welfare rolls. Be-
cause only women become pregnant, it was obvious to Rehnquist
that men and women are not similarly situated with respect to the
problems and the risks of sexual intercourse.
Rehnquist's use of the phrase "similarly situated" shifts the fo-
cus of analysis away from the question of whether a classification
is substantially related to an important governmental objective. In
effect, Rehnquist employs this phrase in order to slide the stan-
dard of review to one of minimum scrutiny. While an important
question under the intermediate standard is whether a sex-neutral
statute would be as effective as the one which was challenged,
under Rehnquist's "similarly situated" approach this element of
the inquiry merely asks whether a sex-neutral classification would
substantially advance important governmental interests.5 2 In the
California statutory rape case, for example, he asserted that a sex-
neutral statute would not only be unenforceable, but also that
young females suffer sufficiently from the consequences of sexual
intercourse and, therefore, may reasonably be excluded from legal
punishment-a criminal sanction that falls solely on males serves
to equalize its deterrent effect. Thus, the inquiry has been turned
on its head in the sense that sex-neutral classifications must be
defended and compared with the challenged classifications that
are based on sex.
The statutory rape case was a five-to-four decision, but Rehn-
51. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 468 (1981).
52. Justice Brennan emphasized this point in his dissent. Id. at 488-89 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
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quist's opinion commanded only a four-person plurality, indicating
that a majority will not subscribe to the implications of the "simi-
larly situated" analysis. However, in a case dealing with sex dis-
crimination implicit in a draft registration requirement,
5 3
Rehnquist again used the "similarly situated" language, and there
were no concurring opinions in the six-to-three decision. The Mili-
tary Selective Service Act, which authorized the President to re-
quire the registration of men, but not women, was challenged as a
violation of the equal protection component of the due process
clause. Rehnquist emphasized that, normally great weight must
be given to decisions of Congress, but that in this case even greater
deference should be accorded to the legislative branch because the
case arose in the context of Congress' authority over national de-
fense and military affairs where "the scope of Congress' constitu-
tional power ... [is] broad, [and] the lack of competence on the
part of the courts is marked."5 4
Distinguishing previous cases in which the Court invalidated
sex classifications, Rehnquist asserted that the decision to exempt
women from registration was not an accidental by-product of tradi-
tional thinking about women. Indeed, Congress had good reason
to exempt women: "[Congress] determined that any future draft,
which would be facilitated by the registration scheme, would be
characterized by a need for combat troops."5 5 Since women by law
were not eligible for combat, it was reasonable for Congress to con-
clude that they would not be needed in the event of a draft and
that there was no reason to register them. Rehnquist's conclusion
regarding combat restrictions on women was based on the fact that
men and women are not similarly situated for purposes of a draft
or registration for a draft. Although such a statement appears to
invoke the rational basis standard, Rehnquist expressly declined
to apply a specific standard of review to the draft registration
scheme. He justified his reticence by stating that "[a]nnounced
degrees of 'deference' to legislative judgments, just as levels of
'scrutiny' which this Court announces that it applies to particular
classifications made by a legislative body, may all too readily be-
come facile abstractions used to justify a result."5 6
The draft registration case was special in the sense that it in-
53. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
54. Id. at 65.
55. Id. at 76.
56. Id. at 69. As Justices Marshall and White argued in their dissenting opinions,
a substantial number of people in a conscripted military force would fill
noncombat positions. Marshall contended that the exclusion of women from
registration has no substantial relation to the government's interest in main-
taining an effective defense. It was estimated that 80,000 people would have
to be drafted for noncombat positions.
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volved national defense. Thus, the majority's agreement with
Rehnquist's deferential approach to the draft registration scheme
is not at all surprising. Still, it must be noted that Rehnquist's def-
erence to Congress in this area is consistent with his deferential
approach to the Social Security Act. Rehnquist has objected to
challenges to the Social Security Act's provisions on grounds that
special deference should be given to social insurance legislation
since it has undergone so many changes over the years that a nice
fit between a classification and the objective of the legislation is
impossible and because administrative convenience is particularly
important to the success of entitlement programs.
57
Rehnquist's opinions in the area of sex classifications are noth-
ing if not consistent. His minimum scrutiny/maximum deference
approach allows him to presume a rational basis for virtually any
legislative scheme that treats men and women differently. Rehn-
quist's approach to sex classifications constitutes exactly what he
purports to avoid: a set of "facile abstractions" used to justify a
predetermined result-that of upholding the legislation against
constitutional attack.
B. Illegitimacy
Legislative provisions that distinguish between illegitimate and
legitimate children for purposes of inheritance,58 the right to recov-
ery for wrongful death,59 welfare benefits,60 and social security for
surviving dependent children,61 which have been challenged under
the equal protection clause, have not been uniformly subjected to
the intermediate standard of review. Although the level of scru-
tiny is less clear in the case of illegitimacy classifications than it is
in sex classifications, the Court has invalidated illegitimacy classi-
fications in five out of the ten cases that it has decided. Rehnquist
dissented in each of the five cases.
62
Rehnquist voices essentially the same objections to the major-
ity's approach toward illegitimacy cases as he does to the Court's
sex classification rulings. He argues that equal protection does not
require that a states enactment be logical; rather, its only require-
ment is "that there be some conceivable set of facts that may jus-
57. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 225 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
58. Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
59. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
60. New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973).
61. Matthew v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
62. The Court invalidated illegitimacy classifications in the following cases:
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628
(1974); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973); New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v.
Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164
(1972).
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tify the classification involved."63 Rehnquist's dissent in Trimble v.
Gordon64 illustrates his approach in dealing with illegitimacy clas-
sifications as well as his general equal protection philosophy. The
Court, in a five-to-four decision in Trimble, invalidated a provision
in an Illinois law that allowed illegitimate children to inherit by
intestate succession from their mothers only; yet legitimate chil-
dren were allowed to inherit by intestate succession from both
their fathers and mothers. Rehnquist complained that the Court's
approach was confusing because it failed to specify the level of
scrutiny employed. Additionally, he argued that the Court should
not have focused its attention on the purpose of the law or the mo-
tive of the legislature in passing it. Because there will always be
some imperfection in the fit between legislative motives and the
means of accomplishing legislative goals, the Court, by examining
such motives, has put itself in the position of deciding how much
imperfection to allow and what alternative forms of legislation are
available. The crux of the problem, according to Rehnquist, is that
judges are no better equipped to make these assessments than are
legislators. The result of this judicial "meddling" is that "we have
created on the premises of the Equal Protection Clause a school
for legislators, whereby opinions of this Court are written to in-
struct them in a better understanding of how to accomplish their
ordinary legislative tasks."65 In short, as far as Rehnquist is con-
cerned, a standard of review which is more stringent than that of
mere rationality necessarily results in the judicial interjection of
the Court's values into the legislative democratic process.
C. Alienage
In 1971, the Supreme Court declared that "classifications based
on alienage, like those based on ... race, are inherently suspect
and subject to close judicial scrutiny."66 The Court, however, has
not followed through on this pronouncement. When classifications
based on alienage have been questioned, the Court's standard of
review has been similarly undefined. Adding to this uncertainty is
the fact that the Court employs a double standard with respect to
federal and state alienage-based classifications: "[0 ]verriding na-
tional interests may provide a justification for a citizenship re-
quirement in the federal service even though an identical
requirement may not be enforced by a state."67 However, there
are two reasons that classifications based on alienage present a
63. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 183 (1972).
64. 439 U.S. 762 (1977).
65. Id. at 784.
66. 43raham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
67. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 101 (1976).
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somewhat different problem from those based on sex and illegiti-
macy. First, the concept of citizenship itself implies the existence
of favored status for members of a specified group: alienage may
be a relevant classification where illegitimacy and sex are not.
Second, unlike illegitimacy or gender, alienage is not an irrevoca-
ble personal trait; an alien can eventually change his status by fol-
lowing specific procedures to obtain United States citizenship.
In 1973, the Supreme Court employed maximum scrutiny to in-
validate a Connecticut statute that excluded resident aliens from
law practice 68 and a New York law that excluded noncitizens from
holding permanent positions in the competitive, classified civil
service.69 In a dissenting opinion which responded to both cases,
Rehnquist emphasized the importance of the concept of citizen-
ship. The Constitution, he argued, makes a distinction between
citizens and aliens eleven times: "Citizenship [is symbolic of] a
status in the relationship with a society which is continuing and
more basic than mere presence or residence."70 He asserted that
the Court, without any constitutional basis, was arbitrarily award-
ing special protection to particular groups of people. He empha-
sized that aliens can change their status and become American
citizens. In Justice Rehnquist's opinion, it is not unreasonable to
require aliens to demonstrate an understanding of the American
political and social structure and a dedication to American values
by going through the naturalization process.
7 1
Where classifications based on alienage are embedded in stat-
utes controlling employment, the Court uniformally defers to the
legislative wisdom of the state. For example, the Court, in 1978 and
1979;" upheld certain state laws which barred aliens from employ-
ment as state troopers72 and listed citizenship as a requirement for
the certification of public school teachers.7 3 In 1982, the Court up-
held a California statute that made citizenship a prerequisite to
employment in any state, county, or local governmental position
which bestows upon the employee the powers of a peace officer.74
68. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
69. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
70. Id. at 652.
71. In Examining Bd. of Eng'rs., Architects and Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426
U.S. 572 (1976), the majority, applying strict scrutiny, invalidated a Puerto
Rico statute that permitted only United States citizens to practice as civil en-
gineers. Rehnquist, dissenting in part, argued that the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment did not apply because Puerto Rico is not
a state, and the equal protection component of the due process clause of the
fifth amendment did not apply because the law in question was not enacted
by Congress, but by the Puerto Rico legislature, instead.
72. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
73. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
74. Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982).
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Finally, in a 1973 case, the Court stated the exception to the rule of
strict scrutiny of legislation involving alienage classifications:
"[S] crutiny will not be so demanding where we deal with matters
resting firmly within a State's constitutional prerogatives." 75 The
subsequent cases suggest that the exception has devoured the
rule, and that, at least in the area of classifications based on alien-
age, it appears that Rehnquist's position now commands a
majority.
Rehnquist's equal protection opinions involving classifications
based on sex, legitimacy, and alienage clearly conform to his pro-
fessed judicial philosophy. His insistence that the Court apply
strict scrutiny only where racial classifications are involved is con-
sistent with his positivistic approach to constitutional interpreta-
tion, i.e., that interpretation of the fourteenth amendment should
adhere to the original intention of the framers of the Constitution.
Rehnquist is undaunted by the problems that accompany such an
approach. Additionally, his opinions are consistent with his view
of the American constitutional system as a democracy in which the
function of judicial review is simply to prevent the popularly
elected branches from transgressing the limits of their authority,
rather than one to solve substantive problems. Rehnquist's ada-
mant objection to the judiciary's taking an active role in invalidat-
ing legislation that results from the political process is consistent
with his emphasis on the democratic nature of the Constitution.
Finally, Rehnquist's opinions are consistent with his assertion that
policy should be made by the majority rather than imposed by a
minority from outside the political arena. His reliance on majority
rule is ultimately relativistic in the sense that policy made through
proper procedures may discriminate against certain, nonracial,
groups without violating the equal protection clause. Discrimina-
tion, per se, is not prohibited; conversely, equality is not an author-
itative value. The equal protection clause, in Rehnquist's opinion,
is clearly not a substantive guarantee of equality.
V. RACIAL EQUALITY: REHNQUIST'S OBSTACLE COURSE
One immediate purpose of the fourteenth amendment was to
prevent states from passing legislation which treated blacks differ-
ently from whites. Classifications based on race are presumptively
invalid. Therefore, cases involving racial classifications are rela-
tively easy to decide. The determining factor for Rehnquist in
these "relatively easy" decisions is the presence of purposeful dis-
crimination through legislation or other official policy. In the ab-
sence of purposeful discrimination, there is no equal protection
75. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 648 (1973).
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violation. Rehnquist has, in effect, erected obstacles to the utiliza-
tion of the equal protection clause even when racial classifications
are involved. His approach to the state action requirement and his
approach to the closely related de Jure/de facto distinction illus-
trates the limited nature of Rehnquist's interpretation of the equal
protection clause.
A. Significant State Involvement in Racial Discrimination: A
New State Action Formula
While the Supreme Court has consistently held that govern-
ment involvement in racial discrimination is a prerequisite for in-
yoking the protections of the fourteenth amendment, members of
the Supreme Court have disagreed on the degree of involvement
which is required. In Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,76 a case involv-
ing a liquor licensing scheme of a private club which refused to
admit blacks to its restaurant and cocktail lounge, Rehnquist, for
the majority, expressed his view that the required degree of state
action was absent. The state liquor license, he held, did not suffi-
ciently implicate the state in the racial discrimination practiced by
the club. He argued that the presence of "any sort of benefit or
service at all from the state," or any state regulation, does not itself
amount to significant state involvement.7 7 He also distinguished
an earlier case, Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,78 in
which the Supreme Court found that a restaurant that leased its
space from a state agency, and was located within a building
owned and operated by that agency, had a sufficiently close rela-
tionship with the state to come under the restrictions of the four-
teerth amendment. In Burton, there was such a close relationship
between the restaurant and the state that the latter was deemed a
participant in the discriminatory activity. In contrast, the private
club, as Rehnquist pointed out, was located on private land and
was not open to the public-it was a private social club in a private
building. The liquor license did not sufficiently implicate the state
in racial discrimination despite the fact that the state arguably in-
volved itself extensively in the operations of the business by virtue
of its issuing a liquor license. Burton emphasized the impossibil-
ity of stating a precise formula for determining when government
involvement is sufficient to call into question the equal protection
clause.79 Rehnquist, however, appeared to reject this flexible ap-
proach in favor of the more stringent requirement that the state
must directly and specifically "foster or encourage racial discrimi-
76. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
77. Id. at 173.
78. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
79. Id. at 722.
1984]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
nation" before any equal protection claim can arise.80
A more demanding state action requirement would make it
more difficult for members of minority groups to challenge racially
discriminatory practices which would indirectly result from state
action. Rehnquist's approach to state action implies that state reg-
ulation of business or industry will not be sufficient to invoke the
provisions of the fourteenth amendment when "private" entities
directly engage in racially discriminatory practices. 81 Whatever its
result, his approach to the state action requirement is predictible
given his positivistic interpretation of the fourteenth amendment.
A high level of government involvement must be present before
action may be properly considered action of the state for four-
teenth amendment purposes.
B. School Desegregation: The De Jure/De Facto Distinction
In 1968, exasperated by the slow pace at which school desegre-
gation was occurring, in spite of the Court's mandate to use "all
deliberate speed,"82 the Supreme Court charged public school
boards, which had operated dual school systems pursuant to state
laws existing in 1954, with an affirmative duty to eliminate racial
discrimination. 83 Thus, southern school systems that had practiced
de jure segregation in 1954, and remained segregated, were clearly
under an obligation to eliminate their dual systems. The legal sta-
tus of segregated schools in northern cities, where proof of ongoing
purposeful discrimination was made difficult by the fact that such
segregation was not explicitly sanctioned by law, was unclear.
Were such school systems obligated to desegregate?
Under the Supreme Court's early rulings in cases involving
southern schools, 84 it was anticipated that northern school sys-
tems would not come under the Court's desegregation mandate;
theoretically, since segregation of northern schools was not sup-
ported by state action, it must be considered to be defacto, as op-
posed to de jure, discrimination. Thus, such segregation would be
considered to be beyond that ambit of the equal protection clause.
A majority of the Court, however, has taken an approach to north-
80. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 176-77 (1972).
81. Rehnquist authored two other opinions involving the state action question,
but the cases did not involve racial discrimination or equal protection. See
Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
82. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
83. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S 430 (1968).
84. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green v.
County School Bd., 391 U.S 430 (1968).
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ern school desegregation cases which renders the de jure/de facto
distinction less clear than the earlier southern cases indicated.
The northern school desegregation issue was first presented to
the United States Supreme Court a year after Justice Rehnquist
took his position on the bench. Since that time, he has persistently
objected to the way the majority has treated the issue of northern
desegregation. 85 In 1973, Rehnquist lodged the sole dissent to the
majority's holding that a district-wide desegregation plan in Den-
ver was justified on a finding of intentional discrimination in only
one part of the district.86 Rehnquist emphasized the factual differ-
ences between the segregation that existed in the Denver schools
from that which existed in the southern school systems. More ba-
sically, he objected to the Court's imposition in 1968 of the "affirm-
ative duty" to desegregate, characterizing it as an unexplained
extension of Brown v. Board of Education. While Rehnquist con-
ceded that such a duty exists, he maintained that it should be ap-
plied only to southern school systems where segregation had once
been mandated by law.
Rehnquist viewed the Court's reasoning in two northern school
desegregation cases decided in 197987 as a further unwarranted de-
parture from the de jure/de facto distinction. In both of these
cases, the majority held that school boards which intentionally
maintained dual school systems in 1954, and which continued to
maintain them, must show why they have not taken necessary
steps to desegregate. These school boards bear the heavy burden
of showing that their actions, promoting the dual school systems,
serve important and legitimate ends. In Columbus Bd. of Educ. v.
Penick, the Court stated that "actions having foreseeable and an-
ticipated disparate impact are relevant evidence to prove the ulti-
mate fact, forbidden purpose."88 The Court still requires a finding
of de jure segregation as shown by the school boards' (or adminis-
trators') purposeful segregative action in order to justify a legally
imposed remedy for racially imbalanced schools. The 1979 cases,
however, facilitate findings of purposeful segregation by their reli-
ance on proof of intentional segregation in 1954, as well as on the
"foreseeable and anticipated disparate impact" of school authori-
ties' actions.
Rehnquist is adamantly opposed to what he refers to as the
Court's "new methodology." First, he argues that there is no rea-
son to look at a school's actions before 1954, unless the school has a
85. Contra Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
86. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
87. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v.
Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979) (Dayton II).
88. 443 U.S. 449, 464 (1979).
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history of legally mandated racial segregation. Presumably, this
means that schools which were not legally segregated in 1954,
should not be made to bear the responsibility of achieving a uni-
tary system. Second, he argues that the burden of showing a dis-
criminatory purpose should lie with the plaintiffs, and when there
is no evidence to prove or disprove the justification offered by a
school board for its actions, the Court should not hold that there is
a violation of a constitutional right. Rehnquist's approach to de-
segregation is clear. In order to justify the imposition of a remedy
for racially imbalanced schools, the lower courts must find some
action on the part of the school board which intentionally discrimi-
nated against minority students. If such violations are found, the
Court must then determine how great a segregative impact the vio-
lations have on the racial distribution of the schools. The remedy
must only redress the difference; if past violations are found to
have occurred, the proper remedy "is to restore those integrated
educational opportunities that would now exist but for purpose-
fully discriminatory school board conduct."89 In short, Rehnquist's
approach would make it considerably more difficult to challenge
racially segregated schools. Rehnquist's approach would also limit
the remedy to the correction of the actual violation.
Rehnquist has never voted to uphold a school desegregation
plan.9O In light of recent congressional overtures aimed at prevent-
ing the judiciary from expanding its policy of desegregation, it
might be prudent for the Court to keep a low profile in this area.
Should Congress actually attempt to limit the judiciary's remedial
powers with regard to desegregation, Rehnquist could be expected
to side with Congress. Indeed, Rehnquist might take advantage of
such an opportunity and attempt to overturn many of the impor-
tant school desegregation rulings handed down by the Supreme
Court. Although Rehnquist surely would not go so far as to repudi-
ate Brown,91 he would interpret it narrowly as applying only to le-
89. Id. at 524.
90. In United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972), a
unanimous decisions which involved a state law which created a new school
district in Halifax County, North Carolina, the Court held that if the new
school district hindered the dismantling of the dual system, the implementa-
tion of the legislation could be enjoined.
91. But see R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 606-11 (1975). As a law clerk, Rehnquist
prepared a memo for Justice Robert Jackson to be used by Jackson in devel-
oping his arguments for conference on the Brown case. Rehnquist's memo,
entitled "A Random Thought on the Segregation Cases," contained the fol-
lowing passage:
One hundred and fifty years of attempts on the part of this Court to
protect minority rights of any kind-whether those of business,
slaveholders, or Jehovah's Witnesses-have all met the same fate.
One by one the cases establishing such rights have been sloughed
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galy authorized or mandated segregated schools, and would gladly
repudiate its successors, which, in his view, have rendered the de
jure/de facto distinction meaningless.
VI. REHNQUIST ASCENDANT? A VOTING ANALYSIS
Is Justice Rehnquist's influence among the other members of
the Supreme Court increasing? Is his version of the equal protec-
tion clause likely to gain majority support? Are we likely to see
him authoring more majority opinions upholding sex-, illegiti-
macy-, and alienage-based classifications, and invalidating school
desegregation plans? After examining Rehnquist's judicial opin-
ions in 1975, John R. Rydell concluded that Rehnquist's approach
to equal protection was not likely to become the dominant view of
the present Court.92 Other contemporary observers of Rehnquist's
behavior on the Court have asserted that he is the source of vision
that currently informs the work of the Supreme Court. In 1982,
Owen Fiss and Charles Krauthammer asserted that Rehnquist is
emerging as the leader of a conservative bloc consisting of Burger,
Powell, White, and O'Connor, and that his influence is likely to ex-
pand given his relative youth and the likely pattern of future ap-
pointments.93 Thus, the early image of Rehnquist standing alone
in "right field" may soon fade as he rises to prominence in the con-
servative Court of the 1980's.
While Rehnquist has been in the minority in many of the equal
protection cases, he has also been a most vocal dissenter,94 and he
has also spoken for the majority in several important decisions.
Thus, a reading of the Court's equal protection opinions seems to
indicate that Rehnquist might be an emerging leader on the Court.
To test this impression, this section provides an analysis of the
votes in all of the equal protection cases which Rehnquist partici-
pated in through 1981.95 Using data from eighty-eight cases, major-
ity percentages and dissent rates for each justice, and
interagreement scores for all pairs of justices, were computed in
off, and crept silently to rest. If the present-Court is unable to profit
by this example, it must be prepared to see its work fade in time, too,
as embodying on the sentiments of a transient majority of nine men.
I realize that it is an unpopular and unhumanitarian position, for
which I have been excoriated by 'liberal' colleagues, but I think
Plessy v. Ferguson was right and should be re-affirmed....
92. Rydell, supra note 1, at 875.
93. Fiss & Krauthammer, The Rehnquist Court, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 10, 1982,
at 14-21.-
94. Rehnqulst filed an opinion in twenty-four of the twenty-eight cases in which
he dissented.
95. All non-unanimous equal protection cases decided in full, as well as per
curiam decisions that elicited dissenting opinions, have been included in the
analysis. A complete list of cases is available upon request from the author.
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order to determine whether Rehnquist's interpretation of the
equal protection clause is likely to be shared by a majority of the
Supreme Court.
A. Majority-Dissent Percentages
As Table 1 indicates, Rehnquist voted with the majority in 67.8
percent of the non-unanimous cases in which he participated. This
majority participation score indicates that five of the other Justices
voted with the majority a higher percentage of the time than he
did.96 He dissented twenty-eight times; in eleven of those cases he
dissented alone. Also, he ified an opinion in all but four of the
twenty-eight cases.
TABLE 1
Dissents and Majority Participation (Non-unanimous
Equal Protection cases 1972-1981)
Number Majority
Justice of Cases Participation Dissents
N PCT N PCT
Powell 87 79 90.8 8 9.1
Blackman 88 76 86.4 12 13.6
Stewart 88 74 84.1 14 15.9
Burger 88 74 84.1 14 15.9
White 87 68 78.2 19 21.8
Rehnquist 87 59 67.8 28 32.2
Stevens 49 32 65.3 17 34.7
Brennan 88 39 44.3 49 55.7
Douglas 37 15 40.5 22 59.5
Marshall 87 34 39.1 53 60.9
A gross analysis of dissenting and majority participation rates
is misleading because of the relatively large number of equal pro-
tection cases that involved challenges to economic legislation. In
these cases, the Court used the rational basis test to uphold the
law, and Rehnquist voted with the majority. If, however, the cases
are divided into seven categories based on the type of classification
which was challenged,97 a clear pattern does emerge.98 Rehnquist,
in terms of majority participation, ranks sixth in race cases, eighth
in gender cases, last in both alienage and illegitimacy cases, and
fourth in economic regulation cases.
96. See Heck, Civil Liberties Patterns in the Burger Court, 1975-78, 34 W. PoL Q.
193 (1981).
97. The seven case types of challenged classifications are: race, gender, illegiti-
macy, alienage, voting, poverty, and other.
98. However the number of cases is far too small to provide statistical reliability
of the findings.
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B. Bloc and Time Series Analysis
The majority participation percentage permits a general assess-
ment of Rehnquist's position in relation to the other members of
the Court; this does not indicate, however, that the majority sub-
scribes to his interpretation of the equal protection clause. The
question of whether other members of the Court may be moving
closer to Rehnquist's views remains; neither a "bloc" analysis, nor
a "time series" analysis, currently supports an affirmative reply.
TABLE 2
Matrix of Interagreement: Non-unanimous Equal
Protection Cases 1972-1981
MRSH BRN DOUG STVN WHTE STEW BLKM POW BURG REHN
- 95.3 89.2 54.2 55.9 36.7 36.7 32.6 24.1 5.9
- 86.5 61.3 60.8 39.8 42.0 36.8 28.2 11.4
- - 44.4 51.3 35.1 38.9 32.2 5.4
- 53.1 57.2 57.1 70.1 46.9 43.8
- 62.0 71.2 68.6 64.3 48.9
- 75.0 81.5 81.8 70.1
- 89.1 81.7 67.8
- 86.2 72.1
- 81.5
Court cohesion = 55
Sprague criterion = 78
In the bloc analysis, the interagreement percentages indicate
that "Rehnquist's bloc" consists of no more than two justices.
There appear to be two blocs at opposite ends of the spectrum:
Brennan and Marshall received a score of 95.3 percent on inter-
agreement, and Burger and Rehnquist scored 81.5 percent on inter-
agreement. The interagreement scores for Powell, Blackman, and
Burger are all sufficiently high for them to be characterized as a
bloc, with Rehnquist being a marginal member (at best). Thus,
the "Rehnquist bloc" consists of only Rehnquist and Burger.
The time series analysis is even less useful on the important
question of whether Rehnquist's influence has increased with his
tenure on the Court. A comparison of Rehnquist's majority and
dissenting votes by year is outlined in Table 3.
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TABLE 3
Rehnquist's Majority/Dissent Votes 1972-1981
Court Term 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Majority Vote 3 8 9 3 7 8 3 10 2 5
Dissenting 2 7 3 1 2 5 1 4 3 0
Total 5 15 12 4 9 13 4 14 5 5
Percentage
Majority 60 53.5 75 75 77.7 61.5 75 71.4 40 100
Although the collection of cases used was too small to provide sta-
tistically reliable results, no pattern of emerging leadership is
discernible.
VII. CONCLUSION
In Rehnquist's view, the fourteenth amendment was not in-
tended to be an affirmative guarantee of equality. Its purpose was
simply to prohibit the states from treating blacks and whites differ-
ently under the law. Such a view is consistent with his belief in
immanent positivism, requiring adherence to the text of the Con-
stitution and reliance on the original intention of the framers of the
Constitution--even if their intent is not discernable. Rehnquist
consistently argues that the rational basis test is the proper stan-
dard of review where racial discrimination is not implicated. Even
when race is involved, Rehnquist is very reluctant to use the equal
protection clause unless he finds discrimination that is both pur-
poseful and officially sanctioned. His approach to equal protection
analysis flows from his view of the limited role of the judiciary in
the American political system. Rehnquist believes the Supreme
Court should pay maximum deference to the decisions of popu-
larly elected officials. The states, in particular, should be given
maximum leeway to determine the best solution to their problems.
Rehnquist's faith in the ultimate fairness of majoritarianism seems
to be the key to his emphasis on state autonomy and to his mini-
mum scrutiny/maximum deference approach to equal protection.
The analysis of voting data does not support the thesis that
Rehnquist's influence among the other members of the Court is
increasing. However, the number of cases utilized in the analysis
was clearly inadequate for the task of indicating patterns of change
over time. Another variable which adversely affects the reliability
of the analysis of the voting data is the fact that there is a new
justice on the Court, and it is too soon to analyze her voting behav-
ior. In the next few years, it will be important to observe whether
Justice O'Connor will align herself with the Rehnquist/Burger
bloc. Looking toward the future, it is clear that if two new Justices
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are appointed by a conservative republican President, the balance
of power could shift in Rehnquist's favor.
The possibility of a Supreme Court majority subscribing to
Rehnquist's interpretation of the equal protection clause has seri-
ous implications. Despite Justice Stone's footnote in the 1938 case
of Carolene Products, which suggested that the fourteenth amend-
ment might give special protection to members of groups which
have been traditionally disfavored and excluded from the political
process,99 the Supreme Court did not actually begin to give serious
meaning to the equal protection clause until 1954. Since then, how-
ever, the Court has led the American political system-first in the
quest for racial equality, and then in efforts to achieve equality for
women and other traditionally powerless groups. By its willing-
ness to take an active role in interpreting the equal protection
clause, the Court has undertaken the responsibility of shaping and
defining an evolving concept of equality. If a majority of the jus-
tices were to accept Rehnquist's view of equal protection, the
Court would no longer perform such a role. Members of "discrete
and insular" minorities, who have turned to the judicial system be-
cause relief was not available from the democratic process, would
find the courts unresponsive as well. The result of a Rehnquist-led
majority would be an equal protection clause that offers little pro-
tection to racial minorities; virtually no protection to women,
aliens and illegitimates; and no "special" preferential treatment to
members of traditionally disadvantaged groups. Members of such
groups would have no legal recourse if the political process did not
offer them an opportunity to challenge discriminatory policy. On a
more general level, Rehnquist's relativistic version of the equal
protection clause would render equality a value that would forever
remain merely personal, and without intrinsic moral worth, since
the goal of equality can never be enacted into law through a demo-
cratic process.
99. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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